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Abstract 
Many reform initiatives in developing countries fail to achieve sustained improvements 
in performance because they are merely isomorphic mimicry—that is, governments and 
organizations pretend to reform by changing what policies or organizations look like 
rather than what they actually do. The flow of development resources and legitimacy 
without demonstrated improvements in performance, however, undermines the impetus 
for effective action to build state capability or improve performance. This dynamic …/ 
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… facilitates ‘capability traps’ in which state capability stagnates, or even deteriorates, 
over long periods of time despite governments remaining engaged in developmental 
rhetoric and continuing to receive development resources. How can countries escape 
capability traps? We propose an approach, Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation 
(PDIA), based on four core principles, each of which stands in sharp contrast with the 
standard approaches. First, PDIA focuses on solving locally nominated and defined 
problems in performance (as opposed to transplanting pre-conceived and packaged ‘best 
practice’ solutions). Second, it seeks to create an ‘authorizing environment’ for 
decision-making that encourages ‘positive deviance’ and experimentation (as opposed 
to designing projects and programmes and then requiring agents to implement them 
exactly as designed). Third, it embeds this experimentation in tight feedback loops that 
facilitate rapid experiential learning (as opposed to enduring long lag times in learning 
from ex post ‘evaluation’). Fourth, it actively engages broad sets of agents to ensure that 
reforms are viable, legitimate, relevant and supportable (as opposed to a narrow set of 
external experts promoting the ‘top down’ diffusion of innovation). 
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     1
1 Introduction 
Some building is easy. Development projects have, by and large, been successful at 
building physical stuff: schools, highways, irrigation canals, hospitals and even building 
the buildings that house government ministries, courts and agencies. But some building 
is hard. As anyone with experience in development knows, building the capabilities of 
the human systems is hard. That applies to the human system called ‘the state’. Getting 
the human beings in the state to use the physical stuff available to produce the flows of 
improved services (learning in schools, water to farmers, cures for patients) that lead to 
desirable outcomes for citizens has proven much more difficult. 
 
There is no shortage of small and large-scale examples. One of us was recently asked to 
review the design of an education project in an African country; it was the sixth in a 
string of large projects supporting education in this country. The project documents 
described the deplorable state of the capability of the education ministry to even 
implement the project—much less to autonomously define problems, gather and analyse 
information, make decisions based on analysis, and implement their own decisions. 
Therefore the project proposed funding to build more schools but also significant 
funding to build the capability of the ministry. But of course all of the five previous 
projects over a span of twenty years had also sought to build both schools and ministry 
capability, and had succeeded at only one of those objectives.  
 
This dynamic also often characterizes ‘policy reform’: a government succeeds in 
passing laws or creating new boxes in organizational charts or declaring new 
administrative processes, but these ‘reforms’ are frequently not implemented or used. 
Andrews (2011), for example, documents the case of the adoption of public financial 
management reforms in Africa, showing how the higher level and surface processes 
changed (e.g., how budgets were written and new accounting techniques were adopted) 
but how the core processes determining how money was actually spent remained 
impervious to reform. Perhaps the most spectacular large-scale contemporary example 
is that the richest and most powerful nation in the history of humankind has just spent a 
decade—and enormous amounts of blood (almost 2,000 dead) and treasure (over half a 
trillion dollars)—attempting to (re)build state capability in a very small and poor South 
Asian country. The United States is now committed to departing by 2014, almost 
certainly leaving behind a state less capable than what Afghanistan had in the 1970s. 
 
Why has building state capability been so hard? In past work we argued that 
development interventions—projects, policies, programmes—create incentives for 
developing country organizations to adopt ‘best practices’ in laws, policies and 
organizational practices which look impressive (because they appear to comply with 
professional standards or have been endorsed by international experts) but are unlikely 
to fit into particular developing country contexts.1 Adapting from the new 
institutionalism literature in sociology,2 we suggested that reform dynamics are often 
characterized by ‘isomorphic mimicry’—the tendency to introduce reforms that enhance 
an entity’s external legitimacy and support, even when they do not demonstrably 
improve performance. These strategies of isomorphic mimicry in individual projects, 
                                                 
1  See Pritchett and Woolcock (2004); Pritchett et al. (2010); and Andrews (2011). 
2  See the classic work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983).   2
policies and programmes add up to ‘capability traps’: a dynamic in which governments 
constantly adopt ‘reforms’ to ensure ongoing flows of external financing and legitimacy 
yet never actually improve. The fact that the ‘development community’ is five decades 
into supporting the building of state capability and that there has been so little progress 
in so many places (obvious spectacular successes like South Korea notwithstanding) 
suggests the generic ‘theory of change’ on which development initiatives for building 
state capability are based is deeply flawed.  
 
How might countries escape from capability traps? This is the question we begin 
answering in the current article. We first revisit the argument about how and why 
countries and development partners get trapped in a cycle of reforms that fail to enhance 
capability (indeed, may exacerbate pre-existing constraints). We posit that capability 
traps emerge under specific conditions which yield interventions that (a) aim to 
reproduce particular external solutions considered ‘best practice’ in dominant agendas, 
(b) through pre-determined linear processes, (c) that inform tight monitoring of inputs 
and compliance to ‘the plan’, and (d) are driven from the top down, assuming that 
implementation largely happens by edict.3 
 
A second section suggests that capability traps can be avoided and overcome by 
fostering different types of interventions. In direct counterpoint to the four conditions 
above, we propose that efforts to build state capability should (i) aim to solve particular 
problems in local contexts, (ii) through the creation of an ‘authorizing environment’ for 
decision-making that allows ‘positive deviation’ and experimentation, (iii) involving 
active, ongoing and experiential learning and the iterative feedback of lessons into new 
solutions, doing so by (iv) engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are 
viable, legitimate and relevant—i.e., politically supportable and practically 
implementable. We propose this kind of intervention as an alternative approach to 
enhancing state capability, one we call Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). 
We emphasize that PDIA is not so much ‘new’ thinking as an attempt at a pragmatic 
and operational synthesis of related arguments articulated in recent years by an array of 
scholars and practitioners of development working in different sectors and disciplines.  
2  Capability traps in the effort to build state capability 
Development interventions can be usefully analysed at three social levels (Figure 1): 
agents, at the front line and in leadership positions; organizations inhabited by agents; 
and the environment or ecosystem of organizations. Within each category, Figure 1 also 
illustrates the poles of behaviours (for agents and organizations) or conditions (within 
eco-systems).  
 
Frontline workers decide daily between mere compliance with rules (or even negative 
deviations) and positive performance-driven actions. Leaders and managers choose 
between using their positions to pursue narrow private or organizational gain or to   
  
                                                 
3  An important paper by Denizer et al. (2011: 2), however, shows that implementation is actually of 
crucial importance to project quality. On the basis of an examination of 6,000 World Bank projects, 
these authors conclude that ‘measures of project size, the extent of project supervision, and evaluation 
lags are all significantly correlated with project outcomes, as are early-warning indicators that flag 
problematic projects during the implementation stage… measures of World Bank project task 
manager quality matter significantly for the ultimate outcome of projects’.   3
Figure 1: Tensions playing out at different levels of engagement in development 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Pritchett et al. (2010). 
 
create new public value within and through the organizations they run. Organizations 
manage how and from whence they derive the legitimacy needed to survive and thrive, 
balancing isomorphic pressures to comply with external expectations of what they 
should look like and the challenge of demonstrating performance regardless of 
appearance.  
 
At the systemic level, fields of organizations that include suppliers, producers, 
regulators, funders and consumers determine implicit and explicit ways of evaluating 
change and novelty. Systems could reward compliance with fixed agendas of what is 
considered appropriate and ‘right’ practice at one extreme, or look to the simple 
demonstration of improved functionality at another. A second tension also plays out at 
this systemic level, affecting the space created for novelty: closed systems constrain 
novelty and do not allow new approaches to emerge, while open systems facilitate 
novelty (see Brafman and Beckstrom 2006). 
 
Countries find themselves in capability traps when conditions at each level foster 
decisions and behaviours on the left side of Figure 1; this can create a low level 
equilibrium. When the ecosystem for organizations evaluates novelty based on agenda-
conformity rather than enhanced functionality, then the space for novelty is closed and 
subsequently cascades (Carlile and Lakhani 2011). In such situations, organizations 
adopt ‘isomorphic mimicry’ strategies of looking like successful organizations: leaders 
seek organizational survival, continued budgets and rents by complying with external   4
standards of legitimacy instead of encouraging new ideas, products and solutions, while 
front line workers choose routine compliance (at best; at worst, often corruption or 
malfeasance) over concern for the customers, clients and citizens they serve. The 
difficult reality is that once the ‘capability trap’ is sprung there is no incentive—and 
often no possibility—for any one organization or leader or front-line agent to break out. 
 
Much of the literature on capacity and corruption focuses on the role agents play in such 
situations. It is common to hear statements like: ‘The country would progress if only it 
had less corrupt leaders and more capable and concerned civil servants’.4 Blaming 
agents in this way suggests a personalized rather than systemic  perspective on why 
countries remain poor—one which is obviously false. This perspective has yielded 
efforts to discipline agents and limit the opportunities for rent seeking via organizational 
interventions like civil service, judicial and public finance reform. Organizations in 
developing countries have been required to accept such interventions for decades now. 
As Rodrik (2008: 100) notes, ‘institutional reform promoted by multilateral 
organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) is heavily biased towards a best-practice model. It presumes 
it is possible to determine a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements ex ante, 
and views convergence toward those arrangements as inherently desirable’. Such 
apparent convergence is undertaken to ensure continued legitimacy with, and support 
from, the international community. A common example is procurement reform: laws 
requiring competitive bidding are a procedure that many development organizations 
require their client countries to adopt in order to receive financial support. Such 
requirements, for instance, were among the first demands international organizations 
made in post war Liberia, Afghanistan and Sudan. They are intended to constrain 
corruption, discipline agents, and bring an air of formality and legitimacy to the way 
governments operate. 
 
We hold, however, that these reform initiatives are now, ironically, among the drivers of 
capability traps in developing countries, because they create and reinforce processes 
through which global players constrain local experimentation—while at the same time 
facilitating the perpetuation of dysfunction.5 The conditions we allude to have 
characterized the politics and processes of international development since at least the 
1980s, a period when government reform became an important dimension of 
development work. At that time, many external development organizations began tying 
their funds to such reforms, as well as using conditions in structural adjustment and 
other budget financing initiatives (e.g. ‘sector wide’ approaches). This has made it 
increasingly difficult for a developing country to receive external financial assistance 
without committing to change their government and market structures. The 
commitments must be made ex ante and promise reform that is open to visible 
evaluation in relatively short time periods, such that external development partners have 
                                                 
4  For example, Greg Mills from South Africa’s Brenthurst Foundation recently noted that Malawi 
would be doing better ‘If only Malawians were luckier with their leaders’. See his article in the 
Malawi Democrat: http://www.malawidemocrat.com/politics/long-fingers-in-the-warm-heart-of-
africa/  
5  Our argument at the institutional and organizational level is similar to that made by van de Walle 
(2001) about ‘structural adjustment’ in Africa. He points out that engagement of governments in the 
process of reform—even when patently insincere on the part of governments and when reforms were 
not implemented—brought external legitimacy. This contributed to the puzzle of the region with the 
worst development outcomes having the most stable governments.    5
something tangible to point to when justifying the disbursement of funds. In this 
relationship, development partners have to accept proposed reform ideas and sign off on 
their attainment. This role has fed the creation of various scripts defining acceptable 
types of reform. The World Governance Indicators, for instance, guide countries in 
choosing governance reforms by illustrating what is considered legitimate. Similarly, 
the Doing Business indicators inform what reforms are needed to the institutions 
connecting government and the private sector, while mechanisms such as Public 
expenditure and financial accountability (PEFA) indicators focus developing countries 
on conforming with characteristics ostensibly reflecting ‘good international practices … 
critical … to achieve sound public financial management’ (PEFA 2006: 2). 
 
Such scripts, we argue, have essentially closed the space for novelty in the development 
system, imposing narrow agendas of what constitutes acceptable change. Developing 
countries and organizations operating within them are regularly evaluated on their 
compliance with these scripts, and the routine and generalized solutions they offer for 
establishing ‘good governance’, facilitating private sector growth, managing public 
finances, and more. Organizations like finance ministries or central banks gain 
legitimacy by agreeing to adopt such reforms, regardless of whether they offer a path 
towards demonstrated success in a particular context. Leaders of the organizations, for 
their part, can further their own careers by signing off on such interventions. Their 
agreement to adopt externally mandated reforms facilitates the continued flow of 
external funds, which can further various public and private interests. Front line workers 
ostensibly required to implement these changes are seldom part of the conversation 
about change, however, and thus have no incentive to contribute ideas about how things 
could be improved. 
 
The example of procurement reform in countries like Liberia and Afghanistan is a good 
instance of this dynamic in action. PEFA indicators and United Nations models of good 
procurement systems tout competitive bidding as a generic solution to many 
procurement maladies, including corruption and value for money concerns. Competitive 
bidding regimes are introduced through laws, as are the creation of independent 
agencies, the implementation of procedural rules and the introduction of transparency 
mechanisms. These various ‘inputs’ are readily evaluated as ‘evidence’ that change is in 
effect. Countries are rewarded for producing these inputs; government entities and 
vendors subjected to such mechanisms are assumed to simply comply. The result is a 
top-down approach to building procurement capacity (and beyond) in these 
governments, through which external role players impose themselves on local contexts 
and crowd out potential contributions local agents might make to change. These local 
agents have every incentive to treat reforms as signals, adopting external solutions that 
are not necessarily politically accepted or practically possible in the local context. But 
when the conditions are wrong, this mimicry signalling is the easiest route to achieving 
legitimacy, especially when the pathway to creating real value and facilitating actual 
improvement in performance is uncertain, risky and potentially contentious. Local 
agents have little incentive to pursue improved functionality in such settings, especially 
when they are rewarded so handsomely for complying with externally mandated ‘forms’ 
(appearances).  
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3  Escaping capability traps and actually building state capability 
The emphasis on form (what organizations ‘look like’) over function (what they actually 
‘do’) is a crucial characteristic of the capability trap facing many developing countries. 
The challenge of escaping this trap therefore involves focusing on improved 
government functionality as the key to improved state capability. The basic message 
must be that interventions are successful if they empower a constant process through 
which agents make organizations better performers, regardless of the forms adopted to 
effect such change. The politics of this re-focusing recommendation are obviously 
complex. They require, for instance, challenging perspectives about when and how to 
tie development funding to reform results, asking if external agents and solutions can 
build local state capabilities, and clarifying whether and how local agents and solutions 
should play a greater role in their own development. They may also entail adopting 
reforms that, at least initially, powerful critics can deride as unprofessional (‘promoting 
non-best-practice solutions’), inefficient (‘reinventing the wheel’), even potentially 
unethical (‘failing to meet global standards’). These are far from idle concerns. 
 
This section does not address these political narratives. Instead, it offers some potential 
ideas and practical suggestions for how the development process might look if political 
discourse did call for a change in the approach to reforming governments and building 
state capability. As noted above, we fully recognize that others have voiced related 
concerns across various sectors in a range of forums; these previous articulations, 
however, have mostly stopped at critique rather than moving on to propose concrete, 
supportable, implementable alternatives. To this end, our alternative draws on and 
synthesizes related themes that get at the common core idea: ‘learning organizations’ 
(Senge 1990 [2006]), ‘projects as policy experiments’ (Rondinelli 1993), ‘adaptive 
versus technical problems’ (Heifetz 1994), ‘positive deviance’ (Marsh et al. 2004; 
Pascale et al. 2010), institutional ‘monocropping’ versus ‘deliberation’ (Evans 2004), 
‘experimentation’ (Mukand and Rodrik 2005; Manzi 2012), ‘good-enough governance’ 
(Grindle 2004), ‘democracy as problem solving’ (Briggs 2008), the ‘sabotage of harms’ 
(Sparrow 2008), ‘second-best institutions’ (Rodrik 2008), ‘interim institutions’ (Adler et 
al. 2009), ‘upside down governance’ (Institute for Development Studies 2010), ‘just-
enough governance’ (Levy and Fukuyama 2010), ‘best fit’ strategies (Booth 2011), 
‘principled incrementalism’ (Knaus 2011), and ‘experiential learning’ (Pritchett et al. 
2012), among others. 
 
Our proposed approach, which we call problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA), is 
based on four core principles. We are at pains to stress that these are broad principles 
which are consistent with a wide range of implementation options rather than a specific 
single programme or approach. That is, what we are proposing is not itself yet another 
‘solution’ that countries need to implement or a recipe they should follow. Rather, we 
believe these are the elements of approaches that will create enhanced possibilities of 
success in an array of sectors and can be implemented in a variety of modalities and 
country contexts. 
 
The four elements, to be amplified below, stress that reform activities should: 
(i)  aim to solve particular problems in particular local contexts via; 
   7
(ii)  the creation of an ‘authorizing environment’ for decision-making that 
encourages experimentation and ‘positive deviance’,6 which gives rise to; 
 
(iii)  active, ongoing and experiential (and experimental) learning and the iterative 
feedback of lessons into new solutions, doing so by; 
 
(iv)  engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate and 
relevant—that is, are politically supportable and practically implementable. 
We now address each of these items in turn.  
3.1  The importance of solving problems, not selling solutions 
Efforts to build state capability should begin by asking ‘what is the problem?’ instead of 
‘which solution should we adopt?’ Focusing on prevailing problems is the most direct 
way of redressing the bias to externally prescribed forms towards internal needs for 
functionality; it ensures that problems are locally defined, not externally determined, 
and puts the onus on performance, not compliance. It provides a window onto the 
challenge of building state capability, forcing agents to assess the ambiguities and 
weaknesses of incumbent structures, to identify areas where these need to be broken 
down and de-institutionalized, and to look for better ways of doing things.  
 
The idea of a ‘window’ is reminiscent of Kingdon’s (1995) work on policy change. The 
many applications of his ‘multiple streams’ theory show that problems commonly bring 
an array of policy and institutional issues onto the change agenda.7 Faced with problems 
they cannot ignore, agents across the social and political spectrum become aware of 
structural weaknesses they usually do not consider. This awareness often becomes the 
basis of coalition building across networks, where agents at different positions are 
drawn together to deal with a common concern (Zakocs 2006; see also Pires 2011). 
Problems also generate action and change from these communities, given the common 
argument that ‘[i]nstitutional change and improvement are motivated more by 
knowledge of problems than by knowledge of success’ (Cameron 1986: 67). 
 
Not all problems foster such attention and motivation, however. Ridde (2009) shows, 
for instance, that health care reformers in Burkina Faso were quite inattentive to the 
problem of unequal access in the country. He offers various reasons for this, including 
the lack of widely shared measures of access and inequality. Without such measures, 
‘verbal gymnastics’ allowed different stakeholders to hold varying views about the 
issue, some even believing it had been solved by past initiatives (Ridde 2009: 944). His 
observations support Kingdon’s argument that ‘issues’ or factual ‘conditions’ have to be 
politically and socially constructed to gain attention as ‘problems’. This involves raising 
the visibility of issues through spectacular ‘focusing events’ (such as crises), the use of 
statistical indicators, or manipulation of feedback from previous experiences.  
 
Initiatives to build state capability can focus on problems by facilitating this kind of 
‘construction’. This could involve using use tools like the ‘5-why technique’ or 
                                                 
6  The precise meanings and origins of the terms ‘authorizing environment’ and ‘positive deviance’ are 
provided below. They come from different literatures (the first from public administration, the second 
from nutrition) but we have found it fruitful to bring them together. 
7  See Barzelay and Gallego (2006); Guldbrandsson and Fossum (2009); and Ridde (2009).   8
Ishikawa diagrams.8 These serve to deconstruct problems, identify root causes and help 
agents reflect on contextual inadequacies. The 5-why technique pushes agents to 
identify a problem and then answer ‘why’ it is a problem five times. The rationale is 
that agents typically focus on issues and need to think beyond these to specify the 
problem that could motivate change. A seasoned development expert, for instance, 
might say that her problem relates to the lack of a particular ‘form’ of government—or 
externally mandated best practice—but will be forced to reflect on the functional 
challenge when asked repeatedly ‘why’ this matters, and for whom. Imagine the 
following:  
•  ‘The problem is that we get a D on the PEFA procurement indicator, because we 
do not have a law requiring competitive bidding across government’. 
 
•  Why does it matter? ‘Without this law there is an incentive not to use 
competitive bidding in procurement deals’. 
 
•  Why does it matter? ‘Without this incentive, most procurement deals are 
currently done through sole source methods’. 
 
•  Why does it matter? ‘Sole source methods can increase corruption and lead to 
higher procurement costs and lower quality’. 
 
•  Why does it matter? ‘We have evidence that many procurement deals have been 
overly costly and goods are poorly provided’. 
 
•  Why does it matter? ‘High cost, low quality procurement is undermining the 
provision of key services across government’. 
This kind of specification engenders a focus on the high cost and low quality of 
procurement across government, which is a functional problem of performance. 
Contrast this to the starting point where the emphasis was on introducing an externally 
defined ‘best practice’ law to mandate competitive bidding. In shifting the emphasis 
towards a concern for improved functionality, this kind of process uncovers the real 
challenges of building capability in development. In this case the challenge is not to 
adopt a new law but to improve the cost and quality of procurement. This is a much 
more complex problem but the one that needs solving and, crucially, the one that is 
unlikely to be addressed by simply mandating the use of competitive bidding. Problem-
focused processes can get agents to work through the complexity of these problems and 
identify possible entry points for solutions. Cause and effect exercises can help in this 
respect, ensuring problems drive the search for solutions. As an example, Figure 2 
shows a potential Ishikawa analysis of the proposed problem. 
 
                                                 
8  See Ishikawa and Loftus (1990); Serrat (2009); and Wong (2011).   9
Figure 2: Breaking problems down, so that they drive to solutions 
 
  
 
Source: Authors’ summation. 
 
 
Problems always have multiple causes, which a well-constructed problem focus helps 
emphasize. Reflecting this, Figure 2 shows how the procurement problem alluded to 
earlier might be framed and broken down to garner attention and empower a local 
process of finding solutions. The problem effect is specified at the right, for a particular 
sector, using data that helps stimulate attention. It is then deconstructed into potential 
causes and sub-causes, with three major ‘branches’ illustrated—reflecting problems in 
the contracting process, the contracting law and the vendor itself. The issue of sole 
sourcing contracting is mentioned as a potential sub-cause, but is one of many such 
issues and not the focal point of engagement. When local agents are taken through such 
exercises they become invested in solving the problem, focused on the many potential 
entry points to start addressing them, and disabused of the notion that there is any one 
easy externally mandated solution. 
 
When external agents provoke such processes they communicate the intention to 
provide an open space for novelty and an emphasis on improved functionality as the 
basis of evaluating reform. The focus on problems also incentivizes organizations to 
emphasize their performance, and encourages contributions from leaders and front-line 
workers to work for change. Many argue that agents only mobilize such contributions 
when prompted by problems, actively participating in change ‘only when they are able 
to frame the grievances of aggrieved constituencies, diagnose causes, [and] assign 
blame’ (Snow and Benford 1992: 150). All of these influences involve a shift towards 
the right hand side of Figure 1, and out of the capability trap.   10
3.2  The importance of ‘authorizing environments’ for decision-making that 
encourage experimentation and ‘positive deviance’ 
Problem-driven interventions facilitate an escape from capability traps most effectively 
when they point to ‘feasible remedial action [that] can be meaningfully pursued’ in the 
search for solutions (Chan 2010: 3). In this respect, and to be genuinely useful, 
problems must offer local agents a pathway to find solutions. We do not believe 
immediate solutions are needed in these situations, given that agents who see the 
complexity of real problems are seldom likely to accept the mirage of one-best-way 
solutions. Even if they do, given isomorphic pressures, we strongly advise against 
closing the space for novelty by providing or imposing easy answers; even if these 
answers have value, they are unlikely to address all of the problem dimensions needing 
attention. If completely new to a context, they are also likely to lack the political 
acceptance and everyday capacity required to work effectively. As such, external agents 
may possess potential answers but those ‘answers’ must still be experimented with 
through a process that empowers the search for ‘technically viable solutions to locally 
perceived problems’ (Greenwood et al. 2002: 60).  
 
In thinking of what such process should look like, we are reminded of theoretical 
arguments about how policy and institutional solutions often emerge; as a puzzle, over 
time, given the accumulation of many individual pieces. Modern versions of such a 
perspective are commonly called incrementalism or gradualism, and attributed primarily 
to Lindblom (1959), who famously referred to these processes as ‘muddling through’. 
The approach holds that groups typically ‘find’ institutional solutions through a series of 
small, incremental steps, especially when these involve ‘positive deviations’
9 from 
extant realities. One might start addressing the problem shown in Figure 2 by gathering 
evidence of the textbook vendor’s contractual violations, for instance, or building an 
informal database of when textbooks were delivered.  
 
Such steps are relatively cheap and have the prospect of early success, or quick wins. 
The blend of cheapness and demonstrable success characterize positive deviations and 
are important in contexts where change encounters opposition, which is usually the case 
with government reforms in developing (and developed) countries. The small steps also 
help flush out contextual challenges, including those that emerge in response to the 
interventions themselves. Facilitating such positive deviations, through incremental 
steps, is especially important in uncertain and complex contexts where reformers are 
unsure of what the problems and solutions actually are and lack confidence in their 
abilities to make things better.  
 
‘Muddling through’ like this does not mean being muddled in the search for change 
options. Instead, it implies taking a gradual approach to addressing particular problems. 
In reflecting on this, McCay (2002: 368) describes ‘muddling through’ as ‘a go-slow, 
                                                 
9  The notion of ‘positive deviance’ in development comes from important research on nutrition in poor 
communities in Vietnam (see Marsh et al. 2004), where some children, despite the desperate physical 
conditions in which they lived, were nonetheless found to be relatively quite healthy. Seeking an 
explanation, researchers discovered that the parents of the relatively healthy children were routinely 
defying community norms about the ‘proper’ way to feed and raise children. These parents, for 
example, provided their children with several small meals each day rather than one or two large ones; 
continued to feed their children even when the children had diarrhea; and added sweet-potato greens, a 
low-status food, to the children’s rice. On the broader implications of ‘the power of positive deviance’ 
for innovation and reform, see Pascale et al. (2010).   11
incremental approach to problem solving’. Given this, one would expect incremental 
reforms to be focused on specific problems and the contextual realities in which these 
fester. This kind of focus ensures that actions taken in the name of development are 
what Rose (2003: 20) calls ‘relevant’, or ‘politically acceptable and within the resources 
of government’. The focus on problems helps to build political support, with 
incremental reform gains consolidating it. The awareness of factors that are causing 
problems ensures that the chosen solutions are possible, given contextual constraints. 
Stepwise reforms contribute to building capacity and loosening these constraints over 
time.  
Incremental reforms focused on addressing problems frequently result in hybrid 
combinations of elements that work together to get the job done. Various authors have 
described the path to such solutions as bricolage (Dacin et al. 2002: 50; see also 
Campbell 2004: 65), or the process by which internal agents ‘make do’ with resources 
at hand to foster new (or ‘hybrid’) structures and mechanisms.10 The final product thus 
contrasts with what Ostrom (2008) calls ‘optimal’ solutions embodied in external ideas 
of ‘right rules’ or ‘one-best-way’ or ‘best practice’ reforms. As argued, we believe the 
imposition of such ‘optimal’ solutions is a main reason why novelty is constrained in 
development. The process of positive deviance through bricolage is, in contrast, only 
possible when novelty is encouraged and rewarded within the authorizing 
environment11 within which key decisions are made. It is a process that helps 
organizations escape capability traps but must be accommodated by system-wide 
mechanisms that allow non-linear, frustrating (sometimes even contentious) processes 
of change that are liable to produce idiosyncratic (perhaps odd-looking) solutions. In 
Figure 2’s example, for instance, the government might end up proposing a continued 
sole source textbook procurement mechanism because of a deficient set of potential 
vendors, but take practical steps to improve the timing of contracts and provide 
community-level inspections of vendor performance. This is like choosing a slow and 
odd-looking camel to help one ride through the desert, in lieu of a much faster and more 
impressive looking horse, given the camel’s relevance in its context. It is the kind of 
decision that reformers make as a result of positive deviance and experimentation, but 
will always be difficult to ‘sell’ to outsiders who did not muddle through with them, and 
whose primary metric of success or ‘rigor’ is the extent to which a given option 
complies with a known global ‘best practice’ (‘professional’, ‘expert’) standard.  
3.3  The importance of active learning mechanisms and iterative feedback loops 
A problem-driven, stepwise reform process can thus help countries escape from 
capability traps. This kind of process typifies change in the co-operative structures 
studied by authors like Elinor Ostrom.12 Drawing from such experiences, we argue that 
positive deviance and experimentation has its greatest impact when connected with 
learning mechanisms. These ensure the dynamic collection and immediate feedback of 
lessons about what works and why. McCay references such mechanisms in noting that 
                                                 
10 See Mair and Marti (2009). Pritchett et al. (2012) deploy similar language in calling for measures in 
development programming that facilitate ‘crawling the design space’—that is, allowing specific 
project design elements in particular contexts to emerge as a result of pragmatic explorations for best-
fit solutions within the range of possible options. 
11  The notion of ‘authorizing environments’—the delimited organizational domains over which 
managers have formal decision-making authority—comes from Moore (1995). 
12 McCay (2002: 368). This approach is exemplified in Ostrom (2005, 2008).   12
‘[e]fforts to learn and the capacity to adapt … contribute to the emergence of effective’ 
solutions in co-operatives.13 We note further that this learning is active, happening in 
the process of real-world experimentation. In referencing such, Ostrom argues that 
‘[t]he process of choice … always involves experimentation’14 because ‘[i]t is hard to 
find the right combination of rules that work in a particular setting’; as such, one has to 
‘try multiple combinations of rules and keep making small adjustments to get the 
systems working well’.15  
 
Active learning through real-world experimentation allows reformers to learn a lot from 
the ‘small-step’ interventions they pursue to address problems (or causes of problems). 
They learn, for instance, about contextual constraints to change in general, how specific 
interventions work (or not), and how these interventions interact with other potential 
solutions. This facilitates bricolage, with lessons becoming part of the landscape of 
knowledge and capacities ‘at hand’ from which new arrangements emerge in resource 
constrained settings.16 Some call this ‘trying out solutions’ (Baker and Nelson 2005: 
334) while others refer to it as the continuous testing of new combinations of ideas. The 
lessons learned in such experimentation are dynamic and make the biggest difference 
when immediately incorporated into the design discussions about change. In this respect 
the learning mechanism differs significantly from traditional monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms that focus on compliance with a linear process of reform and allow 
‘lessons’ only at the end of a project.  
 
This kind of experimentation and learning is also very different from the field 
experiments used in randomized trials.17 The experimentation we refer to does not 
involve (always) performing a scientific experiment where the context is suspended and 
the intervention (by construction) is not allowed to change or vary over the life of the 
experiment. Rather, it is about trying a real intervention in a real context, allowing on-
the-ground realities to shape content in the process. This is also not about proving that 
specific ideas or mechanisms universally ‘work’ or do not work. Rather, it is about 
allowing a process to emerge through which attributes from various ideas can coalesce 
into new hybrids. This requires seeing lessons learned about potential combinations as 
the key emerging result. The necessary experimentation processes require mechanisms 
that capture lessons and ensure these are used to inform future activities.  
 
Using the procurement reform example shown in Figure 2, one might think of the first 
step as experimentation around an intervention intended to show the possibility of 
positive gain and which yields lessons for next steps. Information about the timing of 
textbook deliveries might be collected to contribute a database of vendor performance, 
for instance, helping foster state capabilities to oversee contracts. The collection process 
could be bound by time and location, focused on a set of districts and a period of just 
one month. In this period monitors would work daily with teams going out to record 
when textbooks were delivered, constantly transcribing lessons about which information 
sources were most reliable, which kinds of questions yielded information quickest, and 
so forth. The lessons would be fed back to collection teams on an ongoing basis and 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ostrom (2008: 47). 
15 Ostrom (2008: 49). 
16 Dorado (2005); Garud and Karnøe (2003); Mair and Marti (2009). 
17 For a discussion of the distinction between ‘experimentation’ and ‘experiments’ in learning about 
development, see Pritchett (2011) and Pritchett et al. (2012).   13
these teams would be empowered to adjust their methods as the lessons suggested; 
perhaps focusing on select sources instead of others. The goal would be to allow front 
line workers and their leaders to find new solutions that improved organizational 
performance, in due course yielding greater state capability and functionality regardless 
of form.  
3.4  The importance of broad engagement for assuring viability, legitimacy and 
relevance 
The discussion should make it apparent that we do not believe that building the state’s 
capability for implementation—or development in general—happens exclusively or 
even predominantly from the top-down. We hold, rather, that change primarily takes 
root when it involves broad sets of agents engaged together in designing and 
implementing locally relevant solutions to locally perceived problems. Our argument 
draws on literatures about institutional entrepreneurship and the importance of 
distributed agency in the process of change and development.  
Many articles in the literature on institutional entrepreneurship start by noting the 
problematic paradox of embeddedness. This asks how agents embedded in institutional 
mechanisms can simultaneously find and introduce changes to these mechanisms.18 
This paradox offers a particular challenge to those who believe change happens from 
the top-down in societies, where the most powerful ministers or managers push through 
radical reforms. Essentially, these powerful agents or elites are commonly considered 
the most embedded in their contexts, and thus are often the least likely to perceive the 
need for change, to have access to ideas for change, or to risk their interests in pressing 
for change. In contrast, agents at the periphery—or front line—are less embedded in 
extant rules, which is partly why they also benefit less from them. Their low 
embeddedness makes them more open to criticizing incumbents and to entertain change; 
but they lack the power to make it happen.  
Given such thinking, change is only possible if something bridges the agents with power 
to those with ideas. At its most simple, this could involve a direct or third party link 
between a central leader and front line agent. Such a bridge could open the elite to an 
alternate awareness of their reality and spur a process of entrepreneurship, through 
which multiple agents combine to define and introduce change in their contexts. These 
can be organizations or individuals. They connect over time—directly and indirectly—
in networks that facilitate transitions from one rules system to another. Different agents 
have different functional roles in these networks: some provide power and others bring 
awareness of problems; some supply ideas or resources, while others act as connectors 
or bridgers. Change comes out of their interactions, not through their individual 
engagements. 
Consider, for example, the importance of connecting the technical head of the 
procurement bureau implied in Figure 2 to political heavyweights protecting established 
vendors’ interests. Consider also the need to involve field-level officers and school 
principals who manage procurement transactions, receive textbooks, and have face-to-
                                                 
18 Carlile and Lakhani (2011) refer to this as the ‘novelty-confirmation-transformation’ cycle and point 
out that organizations need both ‘confirmation’ mechanisms that reinforce organizational continuity 
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face interactions with suppliers. This last group is commonly called deconcentrated or 
distributed agents and is often ignored in state capability interventions or seen as 
passive targets of change. Whittle and colleagues note that this is a major omission, 
‘because an institutional template that is not enacted by all members of an 
organizational field would invariably fail to become an institution at all’ (Whittle et al. 
2011: 552). They argue that any kind of change, including by implication state 
capability building for development, requires ‘the involvement, interaction and conjoint 
activity of multiple actors’ and especially ‘the more mundane and less prominent, but 
nevertheless essential, activities of ‘others’ in the institutional work associated with 
emergent institution-building’ (p. 553). These ‘others’ need to be considered because 
they are also subject to questions of institutional embeddedness. If institutionalized rules 
of the game have a prior and shared influence on these agents, why should they be 
expected to change simply because some leaders tell them to?  
A host of new institutional scholars emphasize the importance of fostering broad 
engagement in the process of institutional change and institution building. Multiple 
entrepreneurs and distributed agents come to implement new institutions through a 
process that promotes ‘understanding, using, and mastering’ them (Jin et al. 1998: 231). 
Such processes can be conceptualized in light of Greenwood et al.’s (2002) influential 
model of ‘Theorizing Change’. They suggest that institutional adjustment typically 
emerges from a process that begins with jolts but passes through a series of five stages, 
with the last two titled diffusion, and re-institutionalization. The details of this model 
are not important for this article. What does matter is that the model suggests an 
extreme limit where change processes in the stages preceding diffusion are 
characterized by narrow, top-down engagement. Diffusion demands broad support for 
change which is not attained through narrow hierarchical processes. This idea is 
reinforced in research showing that higher levels of decision centrality in institutional 
change processes yield lower rates of intra-organizational diffusion (Jin et al. 1998). In 
contrast, higher rates of participation in change decisions produce greater rates of 
diffusion.  
Such effects are amplified where the organization or field undergoing change is large, 
deconcentrated and informal, and where distributed agents co-inhabit multiple other 
fields that foster heterogeneous interests and cognitions in those targeted for change. 
Diffusion is extremely difficult under such conditions and is further undermined by an 
overly-centralized approach to change. One will find that many agents in the 
heterogeneous, deconcentrated group will not implement the adopted changes under 
such conditions. They cannot be forced to do so and will not do so voluntarily because 
they do not share the understanding that change is needed or that the prescribed 
solutions are appropriate. 
We argue that these are the realities of many contexts in which state-building initiatives 
are introduced. Narrowly engaged change processes in such contexts exacerbate 
capability traps, giving front line workers and even indirectly-involved leaders a 
message that their concerns and value-creation ideas are not welcome. We advocate, 
therefore, for the adoption of convening and connection mechanisms that allow broader 
engagement in designing, experimenting and diffusing reforms intended to strengthen 
states. ‘Convening’ typically involves bringing groups of leaders together with key 
implementers to craft local experiments and solutions (Dorado 2005), while 
‘connection’ involves ensuring second and third degree interactions with frontline 
workers who will ultimately have to implement final changes (Andrews et al. 2008).   15
These processes allow and encourage agents to move from left to right in Figure 1, 
escaping capability traps and moving into a context where organizations demand 
inspired, informed and concerned contributions from their people.  
4  Contrasts and similarities 
The main contrast of PDIA would be with the dominant ‘big development’ efforts of 
mainstream development organizations such as bilateral donors and the World Bank. 
These organizations are full of amazingly dedicated and intelligent people, but these 
agents are themselves often locked into ecosystems and organizational practices beyond 
their control. That this leads to problems with effective implementation of Bank projects 
has long been identified and discussed (at least since the Wapenhans Report of 1992) 
but it is very difficult to solve, in part because certain organizational stakeholders have 
the power to veto actual or potential changes.  
 
This dynamic leads mainstream development organizations to be extremely effective at 
some types of development activities and much less good at others. There are two types 
of activities that are easily supported and are likely to lead to success; hence by no 
means have the World Bank (or donors more generally) been widespread failures, as is 
often the caricature. First, if a task really requires a ‘logistical’ solution—e.g., the 
scaling up of a technologically known solution that does not involve high 
implementation intensity in operation—then donor projects nearly always succeed.19 
One should not lose sight of the basic fact that on many standard indicators of well-
being, development has been a massive success, such as the expansion of schooling or 
the ‘millions saved’ through expansion of vaccinations or simple public health 
interventions (Levine 2004). In nearly every physical dimension of access—to roads, 
sanitation, schools, electricity—the approach has been a resounding, unqualified success 
(Kenny 2011). 
 
Second, if a task really requires less government intervention then the donors’ actions 
have often been effective, since scaling the state back out of certain things that were 
both  misguided about cause-effect relationships and  beyond the implementation 
capability of governments was desirable and possible. For instance, many governments, 
through a variety of ideological commitments, policy mis-steps and macroeconomic 
shocks, backed themselves into rationing foreign exchange. This was, by and large, a 
disaster, as it had both economic and organizationally perverse consequences. Hence ‘at 
a stroke’ or ‘policy implementation light’ reforms that eliminated this rationing through 
devaluation and liberalization were truly ‘win-win’ and could be implemented via 
external conditionality and financial support.  
 
Where the ‘mainstream’ approach founders, however, is precisely when it confronts 
activities like building organizational and state capability, since these tasks require (a) 
enormous numbers of discretionary decisions and (b) extensive and intensive face-to-
face transactions to be carried out by (c) implementing agents needing to resist large 
temptations to do something besides implement the policy that would produce the 
desired outcome, and yet do so by (d) deploying ‘technology’ (or instruments) to bring 
about the desired change that are largely unknown ex ante. It is for precisely these types 
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of development activities—and, importantly, elements of activities within more 
traditional technical sectors—that we propose PDIA as a pragmatic alternative. 
 
 
Table 1: Contrasting current approaches and PDIA 
 
Elements of 
approach 
Mainstream development 
projects/policies/programmes 
Problem driven iterative 
adaptation 
What drives action?  Externally nominated problems 
or ‘solutions’ in which deviation 
from ‘best practice’ forms is 
itself defined as the problem  
Locally Problem 
Driven—looking to 
solve particular 
problems  
Planning for action   Lots of advance planning, 
articulating a plan of action, 
with implementation regarded 
as following the planned script 
‘Muddling through’ with 
the authorization of 
positive deviance and a 
purposive crawl of the 
available design space  
Feedback loops   Monitoring (short loops, 
focused on disbursement and 
process compliance) and 
evaluation (long feedback loop 
on outputs, maybe outcomes)  
Tight feedback loops 
based on the problem 
and on experimentation 
with information loops 
integrated with 
decisions 
Plans for scaling up 
and diffusion of 
learning 
Top-down—the head learns 
and leads, the rest listen and 
follow 
Diffusion of feasible 
practice across 
organizations and 
communities of 
practitioners  
 
Source: Authors’ summation. 
 
Finally, we wish to emphasize that our critique and approach share many similarities 
with other new approaches. For instance, Nancy Birdsall and the Center for Global 
Development have been promoting ‘Cash on Delivery’ (COD) aid (see Birdsall and 
Savedoff 2010). This is a mechanism by which donors would deliver resources to 
countries for achievements (versus a benchmark). This frees up the country to achieve 
those results however it wishes; rather than a focus on disbursement against planned 
inputs it would disburse against outcomes, however achieved. Similarly, there are new 
organizations like Innovations for Scaled Impact (iScale)20 that are based on very 
similar principles of bringing together local control over the problem nomination and 
definition stage with support to innovations built within tight feedback looks of 
evaluation and embedded in communities of practice. The World Bank itself is 
attempting support to various types of ‘results based financing’ (see Brenzel 2009 on 
World Bank supported health projects) and the very recently introduced Programme-
for-Results lending.  
5 Conclusion 
This article is a follow up on our past work trying to explain the limited results of many 
efforts to build state capabilities in developing countries. This work’s core argument is 
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that the politics and processes of development interventions have fostered and 
exacerbated capability traps in many developing countries, wherein governments are 
being required to adopt best practice reforms that ultimately cannot work and end up 
crowding out alternative ideas and initiatives that may have emerged from local agents. 
Capability traps close the space for novelty, establishing fixed best-practice agendas as 
the basis of evaluating developing countries and of granting organizations in these 
countries support and legitimacy if they comply with such agendas. In so doing they 
have all but excluded local agents from the process of building their own states, 
implicitly undermining the value-creating ideas of local leaders and front line workers. 
The upshot is unimplemented laws, unfunded agencies, and unused processes littering 
education sectors, public financial management regimes and judiciaries across the globe 
(Pritchett et al. 2010). Governments adopting such reforms look better for a period—
when laws are newly passed, for instance—but ultimately they do not demonstrate 
higher levels of performance, as new laws are not put into practice. 
 
Here we have suggested an approach that can help countries escape from the capability 
trap. It involves pursuing development interventions based on a very different set of 
principles. These interventions should (i) aim to solve particular problems in local 
contexts, (ii) through the creation of an authorizing environment that facilitates positive 
deviance and experimentation, (iii) involving active, ongoing and experiential learning 
and the iterative feedback of lessons into new solutions, and (iv) engaging broad sets of 
agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate and relevant—i.e., politically 
supportable and practically implementable. We suggest that these four principles could 
be combined into a new way of doing development and state building, which we 
tentatively title problem driven iterative adaptation (PDIA). Our aim beyond this article 
is to use PDIA methods in particular interventions, and to gather accounts of where they 
may already have been introduced, the better to learn from the grounded experiences of 
others and to adapt/update/refine PDIA accordingly. As such it is an ongoing process to 
which we actively encourage readers to contribute. 
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